A third way: democracy reloaded

From the very beginning of its history, the debate about democracy focused on two different models of democracy: direct democracy, where people vote on policy initiatives directly, and representative democracy, where people elect their representatives who will in their turn write and adopt laws.

The latter model is the most common, for understandable reasons: the scale of states, in terms of territory and demography, the complexity of governance, rationalization of tasks, division of labour and so forth.

To be legitimate, representative democracy needs some requisites to be met: citizens should indeed vote, and representatives should be perceived as such, that is to say someone who stands for the voters.

The post-electoral crisis in Armenia looks like a crisis of representative democracy. The ongoing mobilization seems something more than a low peak of consensus against a single political leader, the incumbent and confirmed President Serzh Sargsyan: it is a rejection of a system which is lived with a peaceful but stubborn hostility.

First of all, the issue of electoral results: the opposition claims that the electoral fraud machine has completely falsified the results. Some forms of electoral fraud are not that immediate to be tracked, like vote buying, so further investigations should be carried on. But even if the claims are baseless, maths speaks: allegedly 58%, turnout 60%. Sargsyan has been voted – in the best scenario – by less than 35% of voters. A weak legitimacy, indeed.

On the other hand opposition. Oppositions. Republic Squares in Yerevan. Squares in Armenia.

Observers are puzzled, some forces of the Armenian opposition are cautious. The point is that Raffi Hovanissian is playing a crucial role in fostering a civil awakening, but he is not promoting a color revolution.

He is not just proposing to be the replacement of the current president, a well known pattern, but he is asking. He is asking the President he does not recognize as legitimate to give back power to people, he is asking people what they want.

In line with the approach he has been cultivating for ages with his sympathizers, he is collecting opinions and suggestions; he is proposing his line and submitting it to those who believe he is worthy to be listened.

In a way, he is proposing himself as a coordinator of a direct democracy.

It is an interesting, albeit it is still not clear how hopeful, variant: a third way. And wherever it is leading to, this chance to shake a system - which has clearly a thorny issue of legitimacy to handle - should not be missed.

Some progressive countries have opened the floor to people empowerment and shared responsibilities in the decision making process. Armenia is not among them. This episode, this post-election crisis, is food for thought: apathy is not paying back, Armenian crisis is worsening, demographic hemorrhage tells it all. Representative democracies came to life in the pre- compulsory schooling and pre-IT era. They can be accommodated in order to be more inclusive and more open, in view of reduction of public frustration and tensions.

Let’s keep eyes and minds wide open on the “third way”. Raffi Hovanissian is not the kind of person to give up or to be easily co-opted. And a repression tout court now would be awful costs in terms of international and domestic legitimacy. So let’ see if and how there is a path to progress, if Armenia is receptive to a peaceful people empowerment and ready to implement new processes to make it possible. 

Armenia on the eve of elections: foreign policy

Armenia is located in a hostile regional context. On the eve of the presidential election, it’s worthy to look back at Armenia five years ago and now. Armenian Security 2013 is even more precarious than in 2008.

A few months after his troubled inauguration at the presidency Serzh Sargsyan found himself confronted with the least desirable scenario: the country on which Armenia is dependent for most of its imports at war against its key ally: in August 2008, the war broke out between Georgia and its breakaway regions backed by Russia. As a consequence, Russo-Georgian borders were closed. Surely if the Armenian diplomacy in the last past five years scored a success it is the reopening of the crossing point of Verkhnij-Lars in 2010, that actually had been closed before the war, in 2006. The opening - obtained by Armenian and Swiss mediation - marked one of the rare moments of post-war detente and ensured an almost continuous transit of goods and people to and from Armenia.  

The unresolved issue of Nagorno Karabakh
On the other hand, the main regional issue for Armenia is for sure not what’s going on in its North West. The major crisis is represented by the protracted conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh. Because of conflict, the borders are closed with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, the country is permanently under threat, its perception of safety and quality of political debate are far under their potential developments.
Public opinion is strongly radicalized on the issue. Armenians have emerged victorious from the war, and so its willingness to compromise - the only way to a peaceful resolution of the dispute around Nagorno-Karabakh - is very limited, if not absent. Any politician who would dare to pace the path of compromise should be ready to take very unpopular steps.

It is therefore understandable that at the very beginning of his mandate, after the unrests that had marked his inauguration, Sargsyan was very cautious. However as his mandate strengthened and his presidency consolidated, he could have tried to take advantage of a number of benefits he enjoys, compared to other politicians. Firstly, Sargsyan is a Karabakhi. Then, he took part in the war. Last but not least, he was a man of the institutions, in Karabakh, having held key positions in the defense sector. Therefore he’s the kind of politician whose faith in the Karabakhi cause can not be questioned, a person who has a wider margin of action. He has strong links in and with Karabakh, including its social network. He’s one of the few who could have tabled some pragmatic issues, such as the one of the “security belt”, those regions surrounding Karabakh that are occupied primarily for strategic reasons, but which are less connected with the territorialisation of identity and are less perceived as historical Armenian lands.
Now an open debate about these lands sounds futuristic, but until 2010 it could have been at least discussed.

Since 2010 violations of the ceasefire are reported on daily basis, including along the borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Alongside this gradual thawing of the conflict there has been a resurgence of the war rhetoric on both sides. Negotiations continue both within the Minsk Group, and upon the initiatives of the Russian presidency, the latter being clearly concerned about a possible eruption of a war in the Caucasus before/during Sochi Olympic Games. But the results are disappointing.

On the occasion of the recent celebration of the twenty-first anniversary of the Armenian Army Sargsyan noted that Armenia will not be the one to declare war (http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/01/28/Congratulatory-Message-by-President-Serzh-Sargsyan-on-the-occasion-of-Army-Day/). Still, especially in 2012, the President has repeatedly stated that the country will be ready, in case of attack. The times of the Joint Declaration, signed immediately after the war in Georgia when images of bombings were still vivid, seem gone forever. From crisis to crisis, the mediation over the past five years had to regress from the topic of a peaceful solution to the one of conflict prevention.

The Turkish front
Also with regard to relations with Turkey the last five years are a missed chance. The increasingly maximalist positions of the Erdoğan Government in foreign policy haven’t certainly facilitated a dialogue. However, they were chances which were not optimized. The year 2009, with the Protocols and the football diplomacy, looks like a century ago.
The reconciliation is stalling after the crisis of the ratification of the protocols, and no new channels, perhaps less ambitious, are being opened.

While the debate surrounding the G-word progresses in Turkey, undoubtedly, although more in connection with a domestic need for a serene historical memory, the proximity to the Armenian cause and the debates of civilization and democracy associated with as they emerged when Hrant Dink was killed (http :/ / www.youtube.com/watch?v=2e2klbl-nfA) collide with a growing nationalism. This becomes particularly visible, in terms of anti-Armenian attitudes, on the anniversary of the controversial massacre of Khojali.. In 2012, the year of the twentieth anniversary of the massacre, Istanbul hosted a Turkish-Azerbaijani commemoration with a significant number of participants (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RuTsgygwZrI).

In such a difficult regional context, lost opportunities weigh significantly. And that’s – with shared responsibility of all the parties involved - what seems to have happened in the last five years.

Sorry!

Sorry, I'm a bit overwhelmed... hope to be back soon!

Beginning of September: Embarassing

September has begun, chilling South Caucasus.
And unveiling how embarrassing it can be.

Like a cold shower the deliver of Ramil Safarov to Azerbaijan shocked Armenian public opinion.
Before this traumatic event the debate was all about the arrival of Syrian Armenians, fleeing from Aleppo, Damascus, in need of everything, including language courses, driving licences and so forth...
And then, suddenly, a long negotiation reached its end and Ramil Safarov came back to homeland, Azerbaijan, as a hero.

In 2004, during a NATO training in Hungary Safarov hacked with an axe an Armenian engineer serving in the army, while he was sleeping. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Azerbaijan, apparently, asked the Hungarian authorities to let Safarov serve the sentence in his homeland, which in the end was agreed.
As soon as he landed in Baku, he was pardoned, granted the rank of major and an apartment, plus last 8 years salary.

A bad story, gone worse.
It mostly happened during the weekend, which gave, hopefully, time to everybody to develop a proper strategy to defuse tension.'Cause Armenian reaction was clear and strong, as predictably. US also made quite a statement.

Caution seems to prevail among other actors. But Hungary image has been damaged by voices of an alleged flow of Azerbaijani money.
Not to mention the image of Azerbaijan: it's impossible to come to terms to such a celebration of a private case of murder, even taking into consideration that the perpetrator was displaced during the Karabakh war.

The whole case and reactions, at ground level, just unveils how deeply - and embarrassingly - Azerbaijanis and Armenians hate each other. Since last weekend, a bit more, if possible.

In Georgia, in the meanwhile, OSCE observation mission started to release its first notes about the political environment before elections.
In few words, about the "much ado about Ivanishvili" basically created by the government itself.
There's a lot of room for growing embarrassment here, as well. And the official election campaign has just started.

July in bloom (under the storm)

It's a weird summer in Caucasus.
The stormy weather that swept Krasnodar is swirling above south Caucasus as well.
As a result Georgia and Azerbaijan suffered distructions and losses.

Still, at least two men are in bloom.
For Bako Sahakyan and Vano Merabishvili 2012 is the summer of personal satisfaction.
The first has just been re-elected president, allegedly by 47.000 Karabakhi - that is to say the 66% of the (depopulated) region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Previously he had been Interior Minister and head of Security Service of the self proclaimed Republic.
This is his second term. Five years ago he received 85% of votes.
It means he has lost 20% of supporters in five years. Still his leading position is not trembling.
Not as much as the ceasefire, at least.

The low intensity conflict along the ceasefire line goes on, but Sahakyan is not losing his cold blood or his temper.
He sounds quite confident that no conflict will really threat the national security.
In the last month he received visits from the top officials of Armenia, actually during the election campaign.
He promises to promote Karabakh development for the next five years.
Is there something going on - e.g. a flurry of bullets - that deserves a bit more efforts or not?

The second is also another Minister of Interior Affairs is in full bloom: newly appointed Prime Minister Merabishvili.
Once the grey eminence of Georgian security system, he has now turned into a kind of manager on loan to politics.
And as the storms hits badly Georgia, he is displaying his crisis management abilities, like the perfect businessman.
No "international" tributes to him (and to his new government, which looks pretty much militarized). Still, it all smells like a election campaign as well.
And it's a long election campaign, indeed, that is draining not waters, but energies and legitimacy in the country already since months. And it's yet a long way till October.
A long, rocky and steep path, under a persistent storm of rain and hail.

End of June: Unnecessary crises

The last two month, and even more the last days, saw a proliferation of measures that would be meaningful only in the context of crises.
Just, there are no signs of the crises which would have possibly have pushed to adopt such measures.

This unexpected development doesn't prevent, by the way, real crises from going on and exacerbating (the low intensity conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan, the suspension of the Gali IPRM).
The perfect "new wave of crises" generators seem to be the Georgian government.
Popular, stable, in a leading position since years, it's taking steps that look totally irrational to an external observer.
First of all all the management of the "Ivanishvili issue": an overreaction to the rise of a challenger - who would have had very few chances to overcome the present majority - which is mining the credibility of the government abroad, creating an unprecedented mess in the legal framework of the country, polarizing society and displaying a hardly bearable level of public manipulation.

Then, in the last two days, two other incomprehensible measures adopted by a Parliament and a Government which are entering in the last three months of their activity: the new strategy towards North Caucasus and The Great Reshuffle of the government itself. Both measures are legitimate, of course, but sound weird and very unnecessary, especially compared to the declarations of all Georgian high ranked public officials so far, starting from the President himself.
Mikheil Saakashvili always praised the good cooperation between Georgian and North Caucasian and never mentioned the need to create a new strategy. And in the way it is put it won't be surprising to see it taken as a blatant provocation by Russian authorities.
As for The Big Reshuffle, that is to say the appointment of Vano Merabishvili as the new Prime Minister, it's a total enigma. First of all because Merabishvili is himself a bit of an enigma: the hardliner former Minister of Interior Affairs cannot be blamed for being too talkative. All that it's clear about him is that he is tough, perhaps radical, powerful and loyal, apparently, to the President.

The personal relations between Saakashvili and Merabishvili - or even the "inter-personal hierarchy" - are somehow a matter kept for the corridors of Georgian higher institutions. So what led Saakashvili to move Merabishvili to the second highest cadre of the Government will be an issue of speculations for days, or perhaps weeks.
One thing is for sure: never in the last months was a frustration for the performances of the former Prime Minister expressed. And there was no perception, as well, of a dysfunction within the Government Cabinet.

If it's an electoral step, one wonders on what bases. Society is indeed satisfied with the improvement of security, but it doesn't mean that Merabishvili himself is loved and popular. The program he's submitting to the Parliament sounds indeed like an electoral platform (employment, agriculture etc.) so it may mark the start of the un-official National Movement political campaign. Did the Party need all this?
A very unexpected move, thou.

And talking about government and speculations: it took more than one month to unveil the composition of the new Armenian government. Surprisingly and unexpectedly - again - long negotiations, whereas the clear success of the Republican Party might have suggested a fast process.
Even more in the light of the urgent need for stability to face the ongoing border crisis.
So, is it a mis-perception of what's going on? And who's not sensing properly? Observers of actors?

Break in May/June

I'll be back in July, hopefully