September has begun, chilling South Caucasus.
And unveiling how embarrassing it can be.
Like a cold shower the deliver of Ramil Safarov to Azerbaijan shocked Armenian public opinion.
Before this traumatic event the debate was all about the arrival of Syrian Armenians, fleeing from Aleppo, Damascus, in need of everything, including language courses, driving licences and so forth...
And then, suddenly, a long negotiation reached its end and Ramil Safarov came back to homeland, Azerbaijan, as a hero.
In 2004, during a NATO training in Hungary Safarov hacked with an axe an Armenian engineer serving in the army, while he was sleeping. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Azerbaijan, apparently, asked the Hungarian authorities to let Safarov serve the sentence in his homeland, which in the end was agreed.
As soon as he landed in Baku, he was pardoned, granted the rank of major and an apartment, plus last 8 years salary.
A bad story, gone worse.
It mostly happened during the weekend, which gave, hopefully, time to everybody to develop a proper strategy to defuse tension.'Cause Armenian reaction was clear and strong, as predictably. US also made quite a statement.
Caution seems to prevail among other actors. But Hungary image has been damaged by voices of an alleged flow of Azerbaijani money.
Not to mention the image of Azerbaijan: it's impossible to come to terms to such a celebration of a private case of murder, even taking into consideration that the perpetrator was displaced during the Karabakh war.
The whole case and reactions, at ground level, just unveils how deeply - and embarrassingly - Azerbaijanis and Armenians hate each other. Since last weekend, a bit more, if possible.
In Georgia, in the meanwhile, OSCE observation mission started to release its first notes about the political environment before elections.
In few words, about the "much ado about Ivanishvili" basically created by the government itself.
There's a lot of room for growing embarrassment here, as well. And the official election campaign has just started.
Monday, September 3, 2012
Saturday, July 21, 2012
July in bloom (under the storm)
It's a weird summer in Caucasus.
The stormy weather that swept Krasnodar is swirling above south Caucasus as well.
As a result Georgia and Azerbaijan suffered distructions and losses.
Still, at least two men are in bloom.
For Bako Sahakyan and Vano Merabishvili 2012 is the summer of personal satisfaction.
The first has just been re-elected president, allegedly by 47.000 Karabakhi - that is to say the 66% of the (depopulated) region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Previously he had been Interior Minister and head of Security Service of the self proclaimed Republic.
This is his second term. Five years ago he received 85% of votes.
It means he has lost 20% of supporters in five years. Still his leading position is not trembling.
Not as much as the ceasefire, at least.
The low intensity conflict along the ceasefire line goes on, but Sahakyan is not losing his cold blood or his temper.
He sounds quite confident that no conflict will really threat the national security.
In the last month he received visits from the top officials of Armenia, actually during the election campaign.
He promises to promote Karabakh development for the next five years.
Is there something going on - e.g. a flurry of bullets - that deserves a bit more efforts or not?
The second is also another Minister of Interior Affairs is in full bloom: newly appointed Prime Minister Merabishvili.
Once the grey eminence of Georgian security system, he has now turned into a kind of manager on loan to politics.
And as the storms hits badly Georgia, he is displaying his crisis management abilities, like the perfect businessman.
No "international" tributes to him (and to his new government, which looks pretty much militarized). Still, it all smells like a election campaign as well.
And it's a long election campaign, indeed, that is draining not waters, but energies and legitimacy in the country already since months. And it's yet a long way till October.
A long, rocky and steep path, under a persistent storm of rain and hail.
The stormy weather that swept Krasnodar is swirling above south Caucasus as well.
As a result Georgia and Azerbaijan suffered distructions and losses.
Still, at least two men are in bloom.
For Bako Sahakyan and Vano Merabishvili 2012 is the summer of personal satisfaction.
The first has just been re-elected president, allegedly by 47.000 Karabakhi - that is to say the 66% of the (depopulated) region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Previously he had been Interior Minister and head of Security Service of the self proclaimed Republic.
This is his second term. Five years ago he received 85% of votes.
It means he has lost 20% of supporters in five years. Still his leading position is not trembling.
Not as much as the ceasefire, at least.
The low intensity conflict along the ceasefire line goes on, but Sahakyan is not losing his cold blood or his temper.
He sounds quite confident that no conflict will really threat the national security.
In the last month he received visits from the top officials of Armenia, actually during the election campaign.
He promises to promote Karabakh development for the next five years.
Is there something going on - e.g. a flurry of bullets - that deserves a bit more efforts or not?
The second is also another Minister of Interior Affairs is in full bloom: newly appointed Prime Minister Merabishvili.
Once the grey eminence of Georgian security system, he has now turned into a kind of manager on loan to politics.
And as the storms hits badly Georgia, he is displaying his crisis management abilities, like the perfect businessman.
No "international" tributes to him (and to his new government, which looks pretty much militarized). Still, it all smells like a election campaign as well.
And it's a long election campaign, indeed, that is draining not waters, but energies and legitimacy in the country already since months. And it's yet a long way till October.
A long, rocky and steep path, under a persistent storm of rain and hail.
Sunday, July 1, 2012
End of June: Unnecessary crises
The last two month, and even more the last days, saw a proliferation of measures that would be meaningful only in the context of crises.
Just, there are no signs of the crises which would have possibly have pushed to adopt such measures.
This unexpected development doesn't prevent, by the way, real crises from going on and exacerbating (the low intensity conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan, the suspension of the Gali IPRM).
The perfect "new wave of crises" generators seem to be the Georgian government.
Popular, stable, in a leading position since years, it's taking steps that look totally irrational to an external observer.
First of all all the management of the "Ivanishvili issue": an overreaction to the rise of a challenger - who would have had very few chances to overcome the present majority - which is mining the credibility of the government abroad, creating an unprecedented mess in the legal framework of the country, polarizing society and displaying a hardly bearable level of public manipulation.
Then, in the last two days, two other incomprehensible measures adopted by a Parliament and a Government which are entering in the last three months of their activity: the new strategy towards North Caucasus and The Great Reshuffle of the government itself. Both measures are legitimate, of course, but sound weird and very unnecessary, especially compared to the declarations of all Georgian high ranked public officials so far, starting from the President himself.
Mikheil Saakashvili always praised the good cooperation between Georgian and North Caucasian and never mentioned the need to create a new strategy. And in the way it is put it won't be surprising to see it taken as a blatant provocation by Russian authorities.
As for The Big Reshuffle, that is to say the appointment of Vano Merabishvili as the new Prime Minister, it's a total enigma. First of all because Merabishvili is himself a bit of an enigma: the hardliner former Minister of Interior Affairs cannot be blamed for being too talkative. All that it's clear about him is that he is tough, perhaps radical, powerful and loyal, apparently, to the President.
The personal relations between Saakashvili and Merabishvili - or even the "inter-personal hierarchy" - are somehow a matter kept for the corridors of Georgian higher institutions. So what led Saakashvili to move Merabishvili to the second highest cadre of the Government will be an issue of speculations for days, or perhaps weeks.
One thing is for sure: never in the last months was a frustration for the performances of the former Prime Minister expressed. And there was no perception, as well, of a dysfunction within the Government Cabinet.
If it's an electoral step, one wonders on what bases. Society is indeed satisfied with the improvement of security, but it doesn't mean that Merabishvili himself is loved and popular. The program he's submitting to the Parliament sounds indeed like an electoral platform (employment, agriculture etc.) so it may mark the start of the un-official National Movement political campaign. Did the Party need all this?
A very unexpected move, thou.
And talking about government and speculations: it took more than one month to unveil the composition of the new Armenian government. Surprisingly and unexpectedly - again - long negotiations, whereas the clear success of the Republican Party might have suggested a fast process.
Even more in the light of the urgent need for stability to face the ongoing border crisis.
So, is it a mis-perception of what's going on? And who's not sensing properly? Observers of actors?
Just, there are no signs of the crises which would have possibly have pushed to adopt such measures.
This unexpected development doesn't prevent, by the way, real crises from going on and exacerbating (the low intensity conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan, the suspension of the Gali IPRM).
The perfect "new wave of crises" generators seem to be the Georgian government.
Popular, stable, in a leading position since years, it's taking steps that look totally irrational to an external observer.
First of all all the management of the "Ivanishvili issue": an overreaction to the rise of a challenger - who would have had very few chances to overcome the present majority - which is mining the credibility of the government abroad, creating an unprecedented mess in the legal framework of the country, polarizing society and displaying a hardly bearable level of public manipulation.
Then, in the last two days, two other incomprehensible measures adopted by a Parliament and a Government which are entering in the last three months of their activity: the new strategy towards North Caucasus and The Great Reshuffle of the government itself. Both measures are legitimate, of course, but sound weird and very unnecessary, especially compared to the declarations of all Georgian high ranked public officials so far, starting from the President himself.
Mikheil Saakashvili always praised the good cooperation between Georgian and North Caucasian and never mentioned the need to create a new strategy. And in the way it is put it won't be surprising to see it taken as a blatant provocation by Russian authorities.
As for The Big Reshuffle, that is to say the appointment of Vano Merabishvili as the new Prime Minister, it's a total enigma. First of all because Merabishvili is himself a bit of an enigma: the hardliner former Minister of Interior Affairs cannot be blamed for being too talkative. All that it's clear about him is that he is tough, perhaps radical, powerful and loyal, apparently, to the President.
The personal relations between Saakashvili and Merabishvili - or even the "inter-personal hierarchy" - are somehow a matter kept for the corridors of Georgian higher institutions. So what led Saakashvili to move Merabishvili to the second highest cadre of the Government will be an issue of speculations for days, or perhaps weeks.
One thing is for sure: never in the last months was a frustration for the performances of the former Prime Minister expressed. And there was no perception, as well, of a dysfunction within the Government Cabinet.
If it's an electoral step, one wonders on what bases. Society is indeed satisfied with the improvement of security, but it doesn't mean that Merabishvili himself is loved and popular. The program he's submitting to the Parliament sounds indeed like an electoral platform (employment, agriculture etc.) so it may mark the start of the un-official National Movement political campaign. Did the Party need all this?
A very unexpected move, thou.
And talking about government and speculations: it took more than one month to unveil the composition of the new Armenian government. Surprisingly and unexpectedly - again - long negotiations, whereas the clear success of the Republican Party might have suggested a fast process.
Even more in the light of the urgent need for stability to face the ongoing border crisis.
So, is it a mis-perception of what's going on? And who's not sensing properly? Observers of actors?
Tuesday, June 19, 2012
Thursday, May 10, 2012
The 2012 Armenian Parliamentary Elections: Implications for Armenian Foreign Policy
Armenian parliamentary elections were held on 6 May
2012. Five parties and a coalition won seats in
Parliament. Three of them are opposition parties, two in
the previous legislature were allies of the presidency
party, the Republican Party. The latter comfortably won
the elections. With 45% votes through the proportional
system and 29 seats through the majoritarian one, the
Republican Party has the majority of seats, 69
out of 131.
So the two main issues in Armenian foreign
policy - the protracted conflict with Azerbaijan over
Nagorno-Karabakh and relations with Turkey - will be
addressed in continuity with the policy expressed so far
by President Serzh Sargsyan, unless the regional
counterparts change their strategies. With the party he
chairs being confirmed as the leading political force of
the country, Sargsyan will run for his second term in the
upcoming presidential elections.
(full working paper in English available at http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI) /iaiwp1214.pdf
2012. Five parties and a coalition won seats in
Parliament. Three of them are opposition parties, two in
the previous legislature were allies of the presidency
party, the Republican Party. The latter comfortably won
the elections. With 45% votes through the proportional
system and 29 seats through the majoritarian one, the
Republican Party has the majority of seats, 69
out of 131.
So the two main issues in Armenian foreign
policy - the protracted conflict with Azerbaijan over
Nagorno-Karabakh and relations with Turkey - will be
addressed in continuity with the policy expressed so far
by President Serzh Sargsyan, unless the regional
counterparts change their strategies. With the party he
chairs being confirmed as the leading political force of
the country, Sargsyan will run for his second term in the
upcoming presidential elections.
(full working paper in English available at http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI) /iaiwp1214.pdf
Saturday, May 5, 2012
The day before Armenian Parliamentary elections: A critical juncture
(A reflection about the international context)
The Russian Federation’s security system echelon has been visiting Armenia since the beginning of 2012. In January Secretary of the Armenian National Security Council Arthur Baghdasaryan received a delegation led by Russian Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Valentin Sobolev to discuss the cooperation programme between the Armenian and Russian Security Councils for 2012-2013. In those days President Sargsyan was meeting in Sochi Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev and Dmitrij Medvedev. In February Secretary General of the Russian Security Council Nikolaj Patrušeev arrived in Armenia accompanied by the Commander in Chief of Land Forces Alexander Postnikov, the Federal Military and Technical Cooperation Service Deputy Director Konstantin Birjulin, the Deputy Chief of Boarder Service Nikolaj Kozik, the head of the “Russian border” federal agency Dmitrij Bezdelov and other senior statesmen. Arthur Baghdasaryan held private talks in the Russian Federation Department of Border in Armenia. The delegation was then hosted by the Armenian President. The sides agreed to sign a new treaty and reached agreements on military technical, border defence and emergency situations issues. On 2 April Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov arrived in Yerevan.
Armenia and Russia have a long tradition of deep, comprehensive and friendly cooperation. But in view of the present crisis in the Middle East, Russia is probably focussing on the enhancement of its most advanced southern bases, including Gyumri in Armenia. According to the former Pentagon official and defence analyst Michael Maloof: “Moscow [is] increasingly uneasy in terms of instability in the region of what Syria is just one aspect of a larger problem […]. For example, Russia is moving more troops and modernizing its base in Armenia in anticipation of the whole crisis in the Middle East from Syria to Iran”.
The Syrian and Iranian crises do affect Armenia not only because of the Russian military resources located in its territory, but also because the two countries have significant Armenian minorities. So far Yerevan has not taken the step to repatriate some of them, like Moscow did with Syrian citizens of North Caucasian origins (Itar-Tass, Federation Council to evaluate security of North Caucasians in Syria, 17 Feb. 2012, http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/345990.html; Itar-Tass, Working commissions for admitting compatriots from Syria set up, 26 March 2012, http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/375337.html ). Still it is following the crisis and reports of incidents involving Armenians are widely reported by the media.
For Armenia an escalation of the Iranian issue is particularly worrying. The two states share a border and they cooperate on many fields. Squeezed between Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia has only two open land borders: to the north with Georgia and to the south with Iran.
These real or perceived threats may be a factor influencing voters’ behaviours, leading them to express a preference for continuity, provided that the latter embeds elements of development and social equity.
The Russian Federation’s security system echelon has been visiting Armenia since the beginning of 2012. In January Secretary of the Armenian National Security Council Arthur Baghdasaryan received a delegation led by Russian Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Valentin Sobolev to discuss the cooperation programme between the Armenian and Russian Security Councils for 2012-2013. In those days President Sargsyan was meeting in Sochi Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev and Dmitrij Medvedev. In February Secretary General of the Russian Security Council Nikolaj Patrušeev arrived in Armenia accompanied by the Commander in Chief of Land Forces Alexander Postnikov, the Federal Military and Technical Cooperation Service Deputy Director Konstantin Birjulin, the Deputy Chief of Boarder Service Nikolaj Kozik, the head of the “Russian border” federal agency Dmitrij Bezdelov and other senior statesmen. Arthur Baghdasaryan held private talks in the Russian Federation Department of Border in Armenia. The delegation was then hosted by the Armenian President. The sides agreed to sign a new treaty and reached agreements on military technical, border defence and emergency situations issues. On 2 April Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov arrived in Yerevan.
Armenia and Russia have a long tradition of deep, comprehensive and friendly cooperation. But in view of the present crisis in the Middle East, Russia is probably focussing on the enhancement of its most advanced southern bases, including Gyumri in Armenia. According to the former Pentagon official and defence analyst Michael Maloof: “Moscow [is] increasingly uneasy in terms of instability in the region of what Syria is just one aspect of a larger problem […]. For example, Russia is moving more troops and modernizing its base in Armenia in anticipation of the whole crisis in the Middle East from Syria to Iran”.
The Syrian and Iranian crises do affect Armenia not only because of the Russian military resources located in its territory, but also because the two countries have significant Armenian minorities. So far Yerevan has not taken the step to repatriate some of them, like Moscow did with Syrian citizens of North Caucasian origins (Itar-Tass, Federation Council to evaluate security of North Caucasians in Syria, 17 Feb. 2012, http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/345990.html; Itar-Tass, Working commissions for admitting compatriots from Syria set up, 26 March 2012, http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/375337.html ). Still it is following the crisis and reports of incidents involving Armenians are widely reported by the media.
For Armenia an escalation of the Iranian issue is particularly worrying. The two states share a border and they cooperate on many fields. Squeezed between Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia has only two open land borders: to the north with Georgia and to the south with Iran.
These real or perceived threats may be a factor influencing voters’ behaviours, leading them to express a preference for continuity, provided that the latter embeds elements of development and social equity.
Monday, April 30, 2012
Week 22-29 April: Back to earth
In the last two weeks there was not a single day without a violation of the ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In the last days, violations resulted in casualties.
Incidents are recorded non only along the former administrative boundary line of Karabakh, but also on the border between the two states.
When the Karabakh war erupted, more than twenty years ago, something was different: there was not the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) yet, and Armenia and Azerbaijan were under the same umbrella.
Things have changed since then. Armenia belongs to CSTO and Azerbaijan is not aligned.
In case of aggression, Armenia would most probably call for the protection of the Organization.
The key question is if this low intensity conflict will turn into an open war, that is to say, if one of the two - Azerbaijan, which is more interested in changing the status quo - will try and invade Karabakh and strategically useful sites in Armenia.
The escalation seems at present unavoidable.
Still, in May Azerbaijan is hosting Eurovision, so any military action right now should be ruled out.
In September Armenia will host CSTO drills. Again, it would be unwise to start military operations then. Not to mention that Russian ones, Kavkaz 2012, are planned in the same period.
A summer tentative blitz? The new Azerbaijani armory called for a huge investment. Why, if not for a war?
Someone is playing with fire, but most probably someone else is determined to back the player to earth.
Perhaps someone who is investing a lot in a huge event like Olympiads in the Caucasus and who is well aware that a blitz will never be successful in Karabakh.
So to speak, Abkhazians policy took off, as well.
Separatist officials took an extremely tough stance against EUMM head of Mission and - without even the shortest notice - cancelled the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting in Gali.
It's clear that De facto President Ankvab is not Bagapsh.
Still, in the last three years IPRM proved to be a very valuable instrument, so pragmatically, it would make sense to land, back to earth... in not to the earth of Gali, as EUMM head of Mission is not "persona non grata", to Ganmukhuri or Zugdidi...
In the last days, violations resulted in casualties.
Incidents are recorded non only along the former administrative boundary line of Karabakh, but also on the border between the two states.
When the Karabakh war erupted, more than twenty years ago, something was different: there was not the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) yet, and Armenia and Azerbaijan were under the same umbrella.
Things have changed since then. Armenia belongs to CSTO and Azerbaijan is not aligned.
In case of aggression, Armenia would most probably call for the protection of the Organization.
The key question is if this low intensity conflict will turn into an open war, that is to say, if one of the two - Azerbaijan, which is more interested in changing the status quo - will try and invade Karabakh and strategically useful sites in Armenia.
The escalation seems at present unavoidable.
Still, in May Azerbaijan is hosting Eurovision, so any military action right now should be ruled out.
In September Armenia will host CSTO drills. Again, it would be unwise to start military operations then. Not to mention that Russian ones, Kavkaz 2012, are planned in the same period.
A summer tentative blitz? The new Azerbaijani armory called for a huge investment. Why, if not for a war?
Someone is playing with fire, but most probably someone else is determined to back the player to earth.
Perhaps someone who is investing a lot in a huge event like Olympiads in the Caucasus and who is well aware that a blitz will never be successful in Karabakh.
So to speak, Abkhazians policy took off, as well.
Separatist officials took an extremely tough stance against EUMM head of Mission and - without even the shortest notice - cancelled the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting in Gali.
It's clear that De facto President Ankvab is not Bagapsh.
Still, in the last three years IPRM proved to be a very valuable instrument, so pragmatically, it would make sense to land, back to earth... in not to the earth of Gali, as EUMM head of Mission is not "persona non grata", to Ganmukhuri or Zugdidi...
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