This second post of the series dedicated to the second Nagorno-Karabakh war dwells on its causes. There will be actually two posts about the causes. The current one about long-term causes, and one post to come about conjectural ones.
So, here’s in a nutshell what happened in between the two wars, and how it created the perfect breeding ground for the resumption of military hostilities.
The most remarkable processes were the following
In Azerbaijan:
§ Frustration due to lack of negotiation results
§ Progressive retirement or sidelining of the figures who were prone to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, as the administration who signed the ceasefire was year after year replaced by a new cohort of politicians with a different background
§ Economic growth lead to the ability to purchase weapons, which in turn lead to the persuasion to have achieved military superiority over Armenia
§ A more assertive international position, backed by oil and caviar diplomacy
§ An increasingly strong cooperation with a relevant regional power, Turkey
§ Public radicalization, intertwined with a spread rhetoric of hatred, injustice, the legitimacy of military Reconquista
In Armenia:
§ From 1998 to 2018 presidents who come from Karabakh (the so-called Karabakhi clan), which brought the Karabakh prospective directly to the core of the Armenian State
§ Progressive integration into the Russian sphere, albeit with not total abdication to multilateralism
§ Exacerbation of the encirclement complex and risk of genocide due to the worsening of relations with Turkey, and the latter’s greater cooperation with Azerbaijan (the Armenian assumption that Armenia is the only obstacle to the creation of the Great Turan)
§ Public radicalization, intertwined with a spread rhetoric of hatred, uncompromising attitude
In Nagorno Karabakh:
§ Consolidation of the de facto statehood
§ Progressive change in the perception of the safety belt (See: Consequences of the First Nagorno Karabakh War) from buffer territories to an integral part of the territoriality of the republic, settlement in the area of Karabakhi, and sometimes the growth of revanchism towards areas that were part of the conquered regions in Soviet times but still under Azerbaijani control.
This is in short how the military conflict remained frozen, but the conflict itself kept evolving in the minds and in the choices of its actors.
As for the negotiations, that also kept evolving, it is hard to draft them in brief here. I am just recalling their main features:
§ It remained impossible to deploy an interposition force that would probably have been necessary to reduce the risks of escalation, which materialized in the last ten years-the boiling decade that preceded the second war. Besides the complicated position of the parties, Iran opposed no-regional military presences in the Region (and this exclusion of no-regional actors is consistent with the approach adopted by all Caspian countries to resolve the issue of the state and exploitation of the Caspian Sea)
§ Numberless conflict resolution patterns were proposed by the Minsk Group, by Russia individually, by groups of experts: exchange of territories (e.g. NK-AM corridor for AZ-Nakhchivan corridor), Associated State, Common State, Caucasian confederation, Cyprus model, Chechnya model, asymmetric federalism model, Åland Islands model, Andorra model, and other examples of high level of autonomy of a region and its metropolitan state.
§ The same can be said for the range of proposals concerning security clauses, including the status to be attributed to the secessionist armed forces (e.g. national guard, no army, yes army but with Azerbaijani participation, army that cannot leave the borders of Karabakh, Karabakh exempt from participating in any war Azerbaijani-Armenian etc.)
§ Different modalities of implementation were discussed: single package, step-by-step
§ Just to recall the most recent negotiation stages: 2001 Paris Principles, 2001 Key West agreements, 2007 Madrid Principles, 2010-2011 “Kazan Document”, draft proposals 2019
§ The proposal that emerged from the negotiation crafting: a step-by-step process which foresees the return of displaced persons and reopening of contacts and exchanges. The security belt was to shift under Baku’s control, with timing and modalities to be agreed (probably, first 5 regions, then the two connecting Armenia to Karabakh). The status of Karabakh should be defined at a later stage. For Armenia and Azerbaijan this proposal represents less than they require. Armenia demand the exchange territories (assuming there is something transferable) not for security but for status, that is to say for the recognition of Karabakh. Azerbaijan cannot accept that the future status remains unclear, as it means that its territorial integrity might be questioned.
All in all, after 28 years, the chances to reach a durable peace seemed, even before the war, significantly slimmer that in 1994, when the ceasefire was achieved.
The generation that remember the peaceful Armenian-Azeri of Soviet times was replaced by generations born in a climate of mutual enmity. Economic and social interdependence, again a leftover of the Soviet times and before, were completely severed in 3 decades of blockage.
The war is reducing these slim chances to imperceptibility.
Romans said: Per Aspera ad Astra, (or Per Ardua ad Astra, as it is more spread in the English speaking countries). Hoping they were right, next post will answer the question why this lengthily incubated but procrastinated war erupted last mouth. The Aspera&Ardua of 2020.
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